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THE FUTURE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
AFTER LAWRENCE V. TEXAS1 AND
THE ELECTION OF 2004
Jack B. Harrison

2

The culture war will be over, and the world may soon become “as it
was in the days of Noah.”3
This is the climactic moment in the battle to preserve the
family, and future generations hang in the balance. This
apocalyptic and pessimistic view of the institution of the
family and its future will sound alarmist to many, but I
think it will prove accurate unless — unless — God’s
people awaken and begin an even greater vigil of prayer
for our nation. That’s why we are urgently seeking the
Lord’s favor and asking Him to hear the petitions of His
people and heal our land. As of this time, however, large
segments of the church still appear to be unaware of the
danger; its leaders are surprisingly silent about our peril
(although we are tremendously thankful for the efforts of
those who have spoken out on this issue). This reticence
on behalf of Christians is deeply troubling. Marriage is a
sacrament designed by God that serves as a metaphor for
the relationship between Christ and His church.
Tampering with His plan for the family is immoral and
wrong.
To violate the Lord’s expressed will for
humankind, especially in regard to behavior that He has
prohibited, is to court disaster.4
“It was just crazy, man. And we were just looking at each other and said,
‘Let's do something wild, crazy. Let's go get married, just for the hell of

1

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Jack B. Harrison is a Member in the law firm of Frost Brown Todd where he has a litigation practice
focused on product liability defense, employment discrimination defense, and general business
litigation. Mr. Harrison is also a member of the Adjunct Faculty of the University of Cincinnati College
of Law where he teaches a seminar in Sexual Orientation and the Law, as well as courses in the pretrial
and trial practice areas.
3
Dr. James Dobson, Marriage Under Fire: Why We Must Win This Battle (Multnomah Publishers Inc.
2004).
4
Id.
2
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it.’”5
I.

The State of the World: Is the United States a Burgeoning
Theocracy or Just What is All this Coded Language About
“Wonder Working Power”?6

Given the conventional wisdom that continues to swirl around the
outcome of the 2004 presidential election regarding the impact of “moral
issues,”7 particularly related to gay and lesbian issues and same-sex
marriage, it appears that Rev. Dobson and the self-proclaimed forces of
righteousness in the Republican party, have, for the time being, held back
the floodwaters from the time of Noah. This is particularly true in those
eleven states that added discriminatory provisions to their foundational
governing documents. Yet, in the midst of this arrogantly crowing
theocratic minority, let me, as one who remains firmly rooted in the
historical experience of the Enlightenment, offer some cautionary
observations and some predictions for the future:
Some observations:
•

Despite

the

existence

of

state

constitutional

5
Jack B. Harrison, Britney’s Fling: Taking Marriage Seriously, 26 Natl. L.J. 21, 26 (2004) (quoting
Britney Spears regarding her brief exercise of the right to heterosexual marriage that some claim must
be protected from monogamous, committed gay and lesbian persons).
6
In his 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush used this phrase from an old evangelical hymn,
There is Power in the Blood, stating:

For so many in our country—the homeless . . . the fatherless, the addicted—the
need is great. Yet there is power, wonder-working power in the goodness and
idealism and faith of the American people. . . . I urge you to pass both my faithbased initiative and the Citizen Service Act to encourage acts of compassion that
can transform America, one heart and one soul at a time.
Writing about the use of this language on the webpage of the American Family Association, one of the
leading conservative evangelical organizations in Washington, a few days after the speech, Gregory J.
Rummo wrote the following:
On Tuesday evening, the President was very clear about the need for true spiritual
regeneration evidenced by his specific choice of words, “. . . there is power,
wonder-working power,” borrowed from the chorus of the hymn, “There Is Power
in
the
Blood:”
“There is power, power, wonder working power in the precious blood of the
lamb.”
But those words will become hollow echoes as long as the obstructionists—the
people who become apoplectic at the thought of God and government working in
tandem—manage to block what is the only hope for the down-and-outs of society:
Changed lives through the power of the Cross.
American
Family
Association,
Wonder
Working
Power,
http://www.afa.net/family/GetArticle.asp?id=77 (Feb. 12, 2003).
7
See e.g. Alan Cooperman, Liberal Christians Challenge “Values Vote,” Wash. Post A7 (Nov. 10,
2004).
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amendments defining marriage as between one man
and one women − although apparently not for life −
and the existence of Defense of Marriage Acts, within
the last few weeks across America, Christian religious
congregations celebrated the rite of Christian marriage
for some same-sex couples, just as one did for my
partner Paul and I a few years ago;
•

Even after the election that occurred on November 2,
2004, valid legal constitutionally recognized same-sex
marriages and civil unions occurred in America and
nothing that occurred on November 2, 2004 changed
that reality;

•

Civil recognition of same-sex marriages and civil
unions in Massachusetts, Vermont, and elsewhere have
not interfered with the rights of religious bodies to
refuse to perform such marriages any more than the
Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia8 in
1967 forced religious bodies to conduct interracial
marriages. Those religious bodies who subscribe to
the scriptural view of the trial judge in Loving that:
Almighty God created the races white,
black, yellow, [M]alay and red, and he
placed them on separate continents. And,
but for the interference with his
arrangement there would be no cause for
such marriages. The fact that he separated
the races shows that he did not intend for
the races to mix,9
have never been required to conduct interracial
marriages.

Some predictions:
•

8
9

Even in the face of state and federal Defense of
Marriage Acts and discriminatory constitutional
amendments, within 10 years gay civil marriages and
their civil union equivalent will be legally recognized
in a patchwork of states across America, not unlike the
patchwork of states that recognized interracial

388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 3.
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marriages in the mid twentieth century;10
•

Within that same 10 year period, the sky will not fall,
America will not collapse, and the Apocalypse will not
occur – although Tim LeHaye will continue to make
millions selling books about it11 and Rev. Dobson and
his Focus on the Family12 operation will continue to

10
Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virginia, 1860s-1960s, 70
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 371 (1994); Peggy Pascoe, Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of
‘Race’ in Twentieth Century America, 83 J. Am. Hist. (1996). States which had anti-miscegenation laws
in 1967 included: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
West Virginia. Wallenstein, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. at 436 n. 318.
11
For those who might be unfamiliar with the work of Tim LeHaye, he is one of the authors of the best
selling “Left Behind” series that depicts life and conflict during and after the “rapture” and the eschaton.
12
Focus on the Family was founded by Dr. James C. Dobson, a California child psychologist, in 1977
“in response to Dr. James Dobson's increasing concern for the American family.” Dr. James Dobson,
http://www.family.org/welcome/bios/A0022947.cfm. (last accessed May 17, 2005). The mission of
Focus on the Family is: “[t]o cooperate with the Holy Spirit in disseminating the Gospel of Jesus Christ
to as many people as possible, and, specifically, to accomplish that objective by helping to preserve
traditional values and the institution of the family. Focus on the Family defines its “Guiding Principles”
as follows:

Since Focus on the Family's primary reason for existence is to spread the Gospel
of Jesus Christ through a practical outreach to homes, we have firm beliefs about
both the Christian faith and the importance of the family. This ministry is
therefore based upon five guiding philosophies that are apparent at every level
throughout the organization. These "pillars" are drawn from the wisdom of the
Bible and the Judeo-Christian ethic, rather than from the humanistic notions of
today's theorists. In short, Focus on the Family is a reflection of what we believe
to be the recommendations of the Creator Himself, who ordained the family and
gave it His blessing.
We believe that the ultimate purpose in living is to know and glorify God and to
attain eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord, beginning within our own
families and then reaching out to a suffering humanity that does not know of His
love and sacrifice.
We believe that the institution of marriage was intended by God to be a
permanent, lifelong relationship between a man and a woman, regardless of trials,
sickness, financial reverses or emotional stresses that may ensue.
We believe that children are a heritage from God and a blessing from His hand.
We are therefore accountable to Him for raising, shaping and preparing them for a
life of service to His Kingdom and to humanity.
We believe that human life is of inestimable worth and significance in all its
dimensions, including the unborn, the aged, the widowed, the mentally
handicapped, the unattractive, the physically challenged and every other condition
in which humanness is expressed from conception to the grave.
We believe that God has ordained three basic institutions — the church, the
family and the government — for the benefit of all humankind. The family exists
to propagate the race and to provide a safe and secure haven in which to nurture,
teach and love the younger generation. The church exists to minister to
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make millions13 preaching about its coming;

II.

•

The Constitution of the United States will not be
amended to define marriage;14

•

Marriage will continue to be devalued and demeaned
as an institution by the millions of heterosexuals who
disrespect their wedding vows and cast spouses aside
like old suits;

•

No family values conservative legislator or
organization will propose amending the Constitution to
defend marriage by defining marriage as between one
man and one woman – for life – prohibiting all divorce
and remarriage.

“Going To The Chapel”: The Journey from Loving to Bowers to
Lawrence to Goodridge.

So what is this debate all about then? On June 26, 2003, in
Lawrence v. Texas,15 the United States Supreme Court overruled its 1986
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick16 and declared unconstitutional all state
sodomy statutes.17 The Court rejected majoritarian morality as a legitimate
rational basis for the state’s interference in the most intimate relationships
of its citizens, stating that the two gay men who brought the suit, along with
all other persons, “are entitled to respect for their private lives,” and that the

individuals and families by sharing the love of God and the message of
repentance and salvation through the blood of Jesus Christ. The government
exists to maintain cultural equilibrium and to provide a framework for social
order.
Family.org, Our Guiding Principles, http://www.family.org/welcome/aboutfof/a0000078.cfm
(last accessed May 17, 2005).
13
The budget for 2004 for Focus on the Family was approximately $110 million.
http://www.family.org/welcome/financials/2004annualreport.pdf.
14
President Bush recently stated when asked about the prospects for such an amendment in his second
term that he did not intend to press the Congress to pass the Federal Marriage Amendment. As the
President stated: “The point is, is that Senators have made it clear that so long as DOMA is deemed
constitutional, nothing will happen. I'd take that admonition seriously.” Presidential Interview, Wash.
Post A16 (Jan. 16, 2005). This statement angered some religious conservative supporters of the
President who were quick to remind him that they felt he owed his reelection to them and that as far as
they were concerned, no issue was a graver matter of public concern than saving heterosexual marriage.
See David D. Kirkpatrick & Sheryl Gay Solberg, Backers of Gay Marriage Ban Use Social Security as a
Cudgel, N. Y. Times A17 (Jan. 25, 2005).
15
539 U.S. 558.
16
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
17
Lawrence involved “two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private
lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime.” 539 U.S. at 558.
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“[s]tate cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making
their private sexual conduct a crime.”18 In dissent, Justice Scalia lashed out
at the majority, accusing it of having “signed on to the so-called
homosexual agenda.”19 Justice Scalia correctly noted that the Court’s
decision in Lawrence “dismantles the structure of constitutional law that
has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and
homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is
concerned.”20
Within six months of the Lawrence decision, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, held
that it was unconstitutional under the Massachusetts Constitution to deny
same-sex couples the right to participate in civil marriage.21 The court drew
a line between “civil marriages” − those based upon a civil contract to
which flow the civil rights, benefits and obligations offered by the state −
and “religious marriage[s]” − those based upon some religious or ecclesial
recognition of the relationship within some agreed upon belief system.22 As
described by the court:
We begin by considering the nature of civil marriage itself.
Simply put, the government creates civil marriage. In
Massachusetts, civil marriage is, and since pre-Colonial
days has been, precisely what its name implies: a wholly
secular institution. See Commonwealth v. Munson, 127
Mass. 459, 460-466 (1879) (noting that “[i]n Massachusetts,
from very early times, the requisites of a valid marriage
have been regulated by statutes of the Colony, Province,
and Commonwealth,” and surveying marriage statutes from
1639 through 1834). No religious ceremony has ever been
required to validate a Massachusetts marriage. Id.
In a real sense, there are three partners to every civil
marriage: two willing spouses and an approving State. See
DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 436 Mass. 18, 31, 762 N.E.2d 797
(2002) (“Marriage is not a mere contract between two
parties but a legal status from which certain rights and
obligations arise”); Smith v. Smith, 171 Mass. 404, 409, 50
N.E. 933 (1898) (on marriage, the parties “assume[] new
relations to each other and to the State”). See also French v.
McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 546, 195 N.E. 714 (1935).
While only the parties can mutually assent to marriage, the

18

Id. at 567, 577-578.
Id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20
Id. at 604-605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21
798 N.E.2d 941, 1004-1005 (Mass. 2003).
22
Id. at 953-958.
19
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terms of the marriage – who may marry and what
obligations, benefits, and liabilities attach to civil marriage
− are set by the Commonwealth. Conversely, while only
the parties can agree to end the marriage (absent the death
of one of them or a marriage void ab initio), the
Commonwealth defines the exit terms. See G. L. C. 208.23
In Goodridge, the court dealt only with civil marriage, because, lest any of
us forget, the First Amendment prohibits the state from involving itself
directly in the religious construct underpinning religious marriage. The
court redefined civil marriage in a constitutionally permissible way,
holding, without qualification, that “[w]e construe civil marriage to mean
the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all
others.”24
Following this decision, religious conservatives assured everyone
that this was yet another sign of the end times, unlike all other signs of the
end times religious zealots have identified over the past 200 years of
American history.25 Underneath all of this rhetoric was a profound
forgetfulness of our history when it comes to the invocation of God or the
gods in support of morally repugnant exclusionary laws. Forgotten were
the words of the trial judge in Loving v. Virginia who appealed to God and
the Bible and some understanding of religious morality in upholding the
Virginia statute prohibiting interracial marriage by writing:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow,
[M]alay, and red, and he placed them on separate
continents.
And but for the interference with his
arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages.
The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not
intend for the races to mix.26
The simple fact is that when religion and sacred writings have been
selectively used as support for exclusionary principles, we as a nation have
always regretted it later and been the poorer for it.
The United States Supreme Court recognized this fact in Lawrence,
as it had in Loving when it declared unconstitutional all state laws
prohibiting interracial marriage.27 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court also understood this fact in its decision in Goodridge, when it stated:

23

Id. at 954.
Id. at 969.
See e.g. Alex Heard, Apocalypse Pretty Soon: Travels in End-Time America (Norton, W.W. & Co.
1998); Paul Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture
(Harvard U. Press 1994).
26
388 U.S. at 3.
27
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
24
25
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Marriage is a vital social institution. The exclusive
commitment of two individuals to each other nurtures love
and mutual support; it brings stability to our society. For
those who choose to marry, and for their children,
marriage provides an abundance of legal, financial, and
social benefits. In return it imposes weighty legal,
financial, and social obligations. The question before us is
whether, consistent with the Massachusetts Constitution,
the Commonwealth may deny the protections, benefits,
and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two
individuals of the same sex who wish to marry. We
conclude that it may not. The Massachusetts Constitution
affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals. It
forbids the creation of second-class citizens. In reaching
our conclusion we have given full deference to the
arguments made by the Commonwealth. But it has failed
to identify any constitutionally adequate reason for
denying civil marriage to same-sex couples.28
The rejection of false principles deeply rooted in a misunderstanding or
misrepresentation of religious and sacred writings is, however, always slow
and painful. For example, a year after Loving, polls in America found that
approximately 70 percent of Americans still believed interracial marriage
was wrong and should be restricted.29 In case any doubt exists, such a
statistic shows the danger of using poll numbers as the moral barometer for
civil rights in America.30
It is impossible for us to conceive of ourselves as morally
autonomous human beings in America in 2004 without having the right and
freedom to marry the person we love. It is not surprising then that marriage
has long been seen as a fundamental right.31 Certainly the fundamental
nature of the right to marry is not rooted in child-bearing or procreation, in
that the childless, the infertile and barren, the elderly are all provided the
constitutionally protected right to marry. This right is not rooted in the

28

798 N.E.2d at 948.
In 1968, 72 percent of the American public opposed interracial marriage. In 1978, 54 percent of
Americans continued to disapprove of interracial marriage and, by 1991, Americans finally approved by
the slim majority of 48 percent to 42 percent. See Evan Gerstmann, Same Sex Marriage and the
Constitution (Cambridge U. Press 2003).
30
For example, in the 2004 election, the citizens of Alabama were given the opportunity to vote on an
amendment to the Alabama Constitution that would have removed language in the Constitution
mandating separate schools for “white and colored children” and making references to poll taxes that
were used to disenfranchise black voters. The voters of Alabama rejected the amendment by
approximately 2000 votes, so that today the Alabama Constitution still contains the unconstitutional
requirement that Alabama have separate schools for “white and colored children.” Manuel RoigFranzia, Vote Opens Old Racial Wounds in Alabama, Wash. Post A1 (Nov. 28, 2004).
31
See e.g. Loving, 388 U.S. 1; Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
29
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ability to anatomically perform certain sex acts, because for some, such acts
are impossible because of injury and disability, while others simply choose
to abstain from sex; yet none of these individuals are prohibited from
marrying. The right to marry is not rooted in the maintenance of racial
purity, because couples of widely differing races are now allowed to marry,
although this was not the case for much of the history of our nation.32 As
the Goodridge court articulated it:
The “marriage is procreation” argument singles out the one
unbridgeable difference between same-sex and oppositesex couples, and transforms that difference into the essence
of legal marriage. Like “Amendment 2” to the Constitution
of Colorado, which effectively denied homosexual persons
equality under the law and full access to the political
process, the marriage restriction impermissibly “identifies
persons by a single trait and then denies them protection
across the board.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633
(1996). In so doing, the State's action confers an official
stamp of approval on the destructive stereotype that samesex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to
opposite-sex relationships and are not worthy of respect.
The department's first stated rationale, equating marriage
with unassisted heterosexual procreation, shades
imperceptibly into its second: that confining marriage to
opposite-sex couples ensures that children are raised in the
“optimal” setting. Protecting the welfare of children is a
paramount State policy. Restricting marriage to oppositesex couples, however, cannot plausibly further this policy.
“The demographic changes of the past century make it
difficult to speak of an average American family. The
composition of families varies greatly from household to
household.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
Massachusetts has responded supportively to “the
changing realities of the American family,” id. at 64, and
has moved vigorously to strengthen the modern family in
its many variations. See e.g., G.L. c. 209C (paternity

32

Loving, 388 U.S. 1; see also Naim v. Naim 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated and remanded, 350
U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam), aff'd, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S.
985 (1956). Andrew D. Weinberger, A Reappraisal of the Constitutionality of Miscegenation Statutes,
42 Cornell. L.Q. 208, 212-14, 221 (1957) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause governs the right to
marry); Note, Racial Intermarriage - A Constitutional Problem, 11 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 93, 96 (1959)
(discussing Naim as an example of litigation arising out of the idea that "the preservation of racial purity
is a legitimate objective"); Note, The Constitutionality of Miscegenation Statutes, 1 How. L.J. 87, 92-93
(1955) (discussing why miscegenation statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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statute); G.L. c. 119, § 39D (grandparent visitation statute);
Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 1189 (2003) (same); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d
886. 824, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1005 (1999) (de facto
parent); Youmans v. Ramos, 429 Mass. 774, 782 (1999)
(same); and Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205 (1993)
(coparent adoption). Moreover, we have repudiated the
common-law power of the State to provide varying levels
of protection to children based on the circumstances of
birth. See G.L.C. 209C (paternity statute); Powers v.
Wilkinson, 399 Mass. 650, 661 (1987) (“Ours is an era in
which logic and compassion have impelled the law toward
unburdening children from the stigma and the
disadvantages heretofore attendant upon the status of
illegitimacy”). The “best interests of the child” standard
does not turn on a parent's sexual orientation or marital
status. See e.g., Doe v. Doe, 16 Mass.App.Ct. 499, 503
(1983) (parent's sexual orientation insufficient ground to
deny custody of child in divorce action). See also E.N.O.
v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d at 829-830 (best interests of child
determined by considering child's relationship with
biological and de facto same-sex parents); Silvia v. Silvia,
9 Mass.App.Ct. 339, 341 & n. 3 (1980) (collecting support
and custody statutes containing no gender distinction).33
In a decision following Goodridge, the Supreme Court of the State
of New York for New York County34 decided in Hernandez v. Robles,35
that the New York State Constitution required that same-sex couples be
able to obtain marriage licenses and enter into marriage.36 The court found
that marriage had long been recognized as a fundamental constitutional
right by both New York state courts and federal courts that covered not
only the right of entering into a marital relationship, but the right of
choosing with whom one would enter that relationship.37 The court then
found that for the state to interfere with either prong of the fundamental
right to marry, the state must offer a compelling reason and show that the

33

798 N.E.2d at 962-63 (emphasis added).
Strangely, the “Supreme Court” in New York’s judicial system is actually the trial court, so this
decision will no doubt be appealed to the New York appellate courts.
35
Hernandez v. Robles, 2005 NY Slip Op 25057 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Feb. 4, 2005). On March 14, 2005, the
California Superior Court for the County of San Francisco in Coordination Proceeding: Marriage
Cases, Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4365, found that a prohibition against same-sex
marriage in California violated the equal protection guaranteed of the California Constitution. Like the
New York court in Hernandez, the California court found that the reasons offered by the state for the
prohibition failed both rational basis and strict scrutiny analysis.
36
Id. at 26.
37
Id. at 13-14.
34
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mechanism used is narrowly tailored to that interest.38
In Hernandez, New York offered two rationales for the prohibition
against same-sex marriage: (1) “fostering the traditional institution of
marriage” and (2) “avoiding the problems that might arise from a refusal by
other jurisdictions to recognize the validity of same-sex marriages, even
those which are valid where they are entered into.”39 In rejecting the first
rationale, the court relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence
disapproving majoritarian morality as a compelling interest for interfering
with constitutionally protected rights.40 The court pointed out that the
dissenters in Lawrence acknowledged that the phrase “‘preserving the
traditional institution of marriage’ is just a kinder way of describing the
State’s moral disapproval of same-sex couples.”41 The court further found
that, beyond simply offering majoritarian moral disapproval of same-sex
marriages, the State had completely failed to show how allowing same-sex
couples to marry would diminish the “traditional institution of marriage.”42
The court rejected the State’s second rationale on the grounds that a
state may not ignore its own state constitutional requirements simply
because other states practice discrimination.43 As the Court stated:
At its root, defendant’s second argument is that the State
may excuse its own deprivation of plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights on the basis of discrimination countenanced by other
States and the Federal government. But this simply cannot
be a legitimate ground for denying a liberty interest as
important as marriage. Indeed, if the California Supreme
Court had been so constrained, it would never have struck
down the bar on interracial marriage.44
In recognizing the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry
under the New York Constitution, the court summarized its holding as
follows:
As a society, we recognize that the decision of whether and
whom to marry is life-transforming. It is a unique
expression of a private bond and profound love between a
couple, and a life dream shared by many in our culture. It
is also society’s most significant public proclamation of
commitment to another person for life. With marriage

38

Id. at 14-17.
Id. at 14.
40
Id. at 15, (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583).
41
Hernandez, 25057, slip op. at 15 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601 (Scalia, J., the Chief Justice, and
Thomas, J. dissenting)) (emphasis in original).
42
Hernandez, Index No. 10343/2004 at 14.
43
Id. at 16-17.
44
Id. at 16 (citing Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948)).
39
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comes not only legal and financial benefits, but also the
supportive community of family and friends who witness
and celebrate a couple’s devotion to one another, at the
time of their wedding, and through the anniversaries that
follow. Simply put, marriage is viewed by society as the
utmost expression of a couple’s commitment and love.
Plaintiffs may now seek this ultimate expression through a
civil marriage.
Rote reliance on historical exclusion as a justification
improperly forecloses constitutional analysis and would
have served to justify slavery, anti-miscegenation laws and
segregation. There has been a steady evolution of the
institution of marriage throughout history which belies the
concept of a static traditional definition. Marriage, as it is
understood today, is both a partnership of two loving
equals who choose to commit themselves to each other and
a State institution designed to promote stability for the
couple and their children. The relationships of plaintiffs fit
within this definition of marriage.45
Simply no argument other than animus toward gay and lesbian
persons explains excluding gay and lesbian persons from the institution of
marriage. This reality has become abundantly clear as same-sex couples
have entered into constitutionally valid marriages in America since May 17,
2004, when the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
went into effect, and no other person’s marriage has been at all threatened,
challenged, or weakened in any demonstrable manner.46
Over time, the Supreme Court has made clear its belief that
marriage is one of the most significant and fundamental rights provided
protection under the Constitution.47 In his opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut, Justice Douglas characterized marriage as a “coming together
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the [point] of
being sacred[,]” describing it as “an association that promotes a way of life
. . . a harmony in living . . . [and] a bilateral loyalty.”48 In Goodridge, the
court described marriage in the following terms:
Marriage is a vital social institution. The exclusive
commitment of two individuals to each other nurtures love

45

Id. at 25 (emphasis in original).
Yvonne Abraham & Rick Klein, Free to Marry; Historic Date Arrives for Same-Sex Couples in
Massachusetts, Boston Globe, May 17, 2004, at A1; Yvonne Abraham & Michael Paulson, Wedding
Day; First Gays Marry, Many Seek Licenses, Boston Globe, May 18, 2004, at A1.
47
See e.g. Loving, 388 U.S. 1; Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
48
381 U.S. at 486.
46
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and mutual support; it brings stability to our society. For
those who choose to marry, and for their children, marriage
provides an abundance of legal, financial, and social
benefits. In return it imposes weighty legal, financial, and
social obligations.49
The issue in Griswold was whether the state of Connecticut could
prevent married couples from using contraception.50 In other words, the
question before the Supreme Court was whether actions taken within the
marital relationship to prevent procreation were deserving of protection
under the rubric of the privacy or liberty interest inherent in the marriage
bond.51 The Court found that the state’s interest in banning contraception
for married persons, while perhaps encouraging procreation, was an
impermissible interference in the intimate relationship of “bilateral loyalty”
that created a marriage.52 Thus, the Court in Griswold clearly found that
marriage was not deserving of protection solely because it was the locus for
procreation and the rearing of children.53
In Turner v. Safley,54 where the Court was faced with a state policy
that placed significant restrictions on the ability of inmates to marry, the
Court stated the following:

49

•

“[Marriages] are expressions of emotional support
and public commitment . . . [which] are an
important and significant aspect of the marital
relationship.”55

•

“[M]any religions recognize marriage as having
spiritual significance; . . . [therefore], the
commitment of marriage may be an exercise of
religious faith as well as an expression of personal
dedication.”56

•

“[The]marital status often is a precondition of the
receipt of government benefits (e.g., Social
Security benefits), property rights (e.g., tenancy
by the entirety, inheritance rights), and other, less
tangible benefits (e.g., legitimation of children

798 N.E.2d at 948.
381 U.S. at 480.
51
Id. at 485-486.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
55
Id. at 95-96.
56
Id. at 96.
50
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born out of wedlock).”57
The facets of marriage identified by the Court in Turner as
important, including spiritual significance, are equally significant for samesex couples as for different-sex couples. Yet, this does not mean that civil
recognition of same-sex marriage would force religious bodies to perform
sacramental or quasi-sacramental ceremonies of spiritual recognition for
such relationships.
Today, it seems a forgotten piece of history that for years many
religious bodies in America would not perform the religious rite of
marriage for couples of different races, even in locations where such
relationships were recognized under the civil law.58 In fact, it should not be
forgotten that one of the strongest religious supporters of President Bush in
his 2000 primary battle against Senator John McCain was the President of
Bob Jones University, an institution that, until 2000, categorically
prohibited interracial dating on the grounds that any movement toward
inclusiveness or unity in the world summons forth the Antichrist and the
end times.59 The Supreme Court’s decision in Loving, while striking down

57

Id.
For an interesting discussion of the history of marriage in America, see Nancy Cott, Public Vows: A
History of Marriage and the Nation (2nd ed., Harvard U. Press 2000).
59
In defending itself against challenges to its ban on interracial dating during the 2000 Presidential
primary elections, Bob Jones University posted, in part, the following on its website under the title “The
Truth About Bob Jones University:”
58

Is there a Bible verse or passage that teaches against interracial marriage? No.
Is there a Bible principle upon which the University's interracial dating stance is
founded? Yes.
•

The one-world principle - every effort man has made, or will make, to
bring the world together in unity plays into the hand of Antichrist.
This first began at the Tower of Babel, and it will culminate at
Armageddon when the Lord returns to establish His rule of peace and
harmony for a thousand years.

•

Bob Jones University opposes one world, one church, one economy,
one military, one race, and unisex. God made racial differences as He
made sexual differences. Each race and each sex should be proud to
be what God made it, and none should reproach the other.

Does the University believe that those who choose interracial marriage do so out
of rebellion against God?
No. It does believe, however, that often the promoters of it do so out of
antagonism toward God because they are often the same entities that promote
homosexuality, abortion, and other forms of social radicalism.
http://www.beliefnet.com/story/12/story_1291_1.html (reprinted on Beliefnet with permission of Bob
Jones University) (copy on file with the author).
Bob Jones University later dropped its ban on interracial dating.
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all prohibitions on the civil recognition of interracial marriage, did nothing
to alter the right of religious bodies to refuse to perform religious
ceremonies bestowing the religious rite of marriage upon interracial
couples.60 The same would be true today for the civil recognition of samesex marriages.
The simple fact is that today there are religious bodies that do
perform sacramental and quasi-sacramental celebrations of religious
marriage for same-sex couples, even where such marriages are not
recognized under the civil law.61 For example, Mt. Auburn Presbyterian
Church in Cincinnati, Ohio, had a formal policy stating that the ritual
joining together of either opposite-gender or same-gender couples would be
called a “Christian marriage” until the congregation retreated in 2003 from
its policy to include gay and lesbian persons rather than risk potential
ecclesial disciplinary action. This policy, adopted unanimously numerous
times by the governing body of the congregation stated:
We hold that our policy of inclusion implies and requires
equality in terms of consideration and entitlement in
society, and that marriage between two persons, man and
woman, or a man and a man, or woman and woman, is the
same in the eyes of the Session of Mt. Auburn
Presbyterian Church . . . . Therefore we resolve that
Christian marriage services be held in our church for
homosexual as well as heterosexual couples.62
Other individual congregations and denominations likewise have policies
opening the celebration of religious or spiritual marriage to both oppositegender and same-gender couples.63
The fact that some religious bodies already recognize religious
marriages for same-sex couples does not mean that the civil authority must
recognize such marriages. The Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United

60
U.S. Const. amend. I. See also, State v. Barclay, 238 Kan. 148 (1985) (upholding an ordained Baptist
minister’s right to be free from state coercion, including criminal prosecution, as a result of his refusal to
perform interracial marriages because they violated his religious beliefs).
61
Michael J. Kanotz, For Better or for Worse: A Critical Analysis of Florida’s Defense of Marriage Act,
25 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 439, 439 (1998).
62
The Presbyterian Church (USA) by the Presbytery of Cincinnati v. Rev. A. Stephen Van Kuiken,
Disciplinary Case 2003-1, Permanent Judicial Commission, Synod of the Covenant (April 30, 2004). In
the interest of full disclosure, my partner, Paul Brownell, and I were married by Rev. Van Kuiken at Mt.
Auburn Presbyterian Church on April 15, 2000 in a service of Christian marriage.
63
Kanotz, supra note 61, at 439. Currently, both the Metropolitan Community Church and the
Unitarian Universalist Association have denominational positions allowing same sex religious marriages
to be performed within their congregations. See http://www.mccchurch.org; http://www.uua.org.
Additionally, a number of individual United Church of Christ congregations allow same sex marriage
ceremonies to occur within their congregations. A number of mainline Protestant congregations and
Jewish synagogues in the United States also provide alternative rites to marriage for same sex couples,
such as Holy Unions or Commitment Services.
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States, decided this issue when the Court upheld the criminal conviction of
a Mormon for practicing polygamy at a time when polygamous marriages
were sanctioned within the Mormon faith. The Court rejected the argument
that Congress’ prohibition of polygamy violated the defendant's right to the
free exercise of religion.64
In Potter, a more recent case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit focused on whether or not the state had a compelling
interest in prohibiting polygamous marriages that were at the heart of the
appellant’s religious belief.65 A city police officer in Potter claimed that his
termination for practicing polygamy violated his right to the free exercise of
his religion under the First Amendment.66 In upholding the lower court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the state, the Tenth Circuit did not
simply say that Reynolds was dispositive or that marriage was simply
between one man and one woman — end of story.67 Rather, the court
conducted a relatively thorough analysis to determine whether the state
actually had an articulated compelling interest for infringing upon a
religious practice that was, in fact, recognized as a core religious practice
by the religious body to which the police officer belonged.68 The court
concluded that the state had a compelling interest in prohibiting
polygamous marriages to preserve monogamy, which was shown by “a vast
and convoluted network of other laws clearly establishing its compelling
state interest in and commitment to a system of domestic relations based
exclusively upon the practice of monogamy as opposed to plural
marriage.”69
Leaving aside the circularity of the court’s reasoning in Potter, the
importance of this case when read in light of the Supreme Court’s analysis
in Lawrence, is its requirement that the state show a compelling interest in
prohibiting civil recognition of marriages recognized as valid spiritual
marriages by religious bodies through their own sacramental and quasisacramental ceremonies. The requirement that the state must show a
compelling interest is as true for those states that seek to prohibit same-sex
civil marriages that are recognized by the religious bodies to which the
couple belongs as it was in the case of the state’s efforts to prohibit the
polygamous marriages at issue in Potter.70
Moreover, what of sexual activity itself? Is there something in the
sexual consummation of a marriage itself that elevates a marital relationship

64

98 U.S. 145 (1878).
Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1066-1067.
67
Id. at 1066-1070.
68
Id. at 1068-1070.
69
Id. at 1070 (quoting Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126, 1138 (D. Utah 1984)).
70
See discussions of Goodridge, supra n. 21; Hernandez, supra n. 41.
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to a position requiring constitutional protection? In Turner, the Court in
determining whether inmates had a constitutionally protected right to marry
pointed out that “most inmates eventually will be released by parole or
commutation, and therefore most inmate marriages are formed in the
expectation that they ultimately will be fully consummated.”71 Yet, while
the Court found that the sexual consummation of the marriage was of some
constitutional significance in that most inmate marriages have an
expectation of consummation, it did not hold that such a physical
consummation was necessary for all marital relationships to be deserving of
constitutional protection.72
While the Court has held repeatedly that the marital relationship is
fundamental and deserving of protection, it has also repeatedly held that the
constitutional import of the relationship is not solely rooted in the
procreative or the sexual nature of the relationship.73 In fact, under the
Supreme Court’s marriage jurisprudence, the infertile, the barren, those
physically incapable of sex, those physically incapable of bearing children,
and those who simply decide to remain childless all have a fundamental
right to marry that is provided constitutional protection.74 So if the
constitutional protection recognized by the Court is not about sexual
consummation and is not about bearing children and if, as the Court held in
Lawrence, it cannot be about majoritarian morality,75 then what remains as
a legitimate constitutional basis for a prohibition against same-sex
marriage? What reasons will be seen as compelling enough?
Since Lawrence found that traditional majoritarian moral rationales
for classifying persons based on sexual orientation did not even pass muster
under rational basis review, then unless some new arguments are found, the
Court will ultimately be forced to hold, correctly I think, that the only
reason for excluding gay and lesbian persons from the fundamental right of
marriage is unlawful discriminatory animus. Obviously Justice Scalia read
Lawrence in just this manner, as is made clear in his dissent in that case:
At the end of its opinion — after having laid waste the
foundations of our rational-basis jurisprudence—the Court
says that the present case “does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any

71

Turner, 482 U.S. at 96 (emphasis added).
Id.; see generally Mark Strasser, The Right to Marry: Making the Case Go Forward: Interpretations
of Loving in Lawrence, Baker, and Goodridge: On Equal Protection and the Tiers of Scrutiny, 13
Widener L.J. 859 (2004).
73
See e.g. Griswold, Turner, Loving, and discussion supra n. 31.
74
Id. See also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating “what justification could there
possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising ‘the liberty protected
by the Constitution[?’] Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are
allowed to marry.” (citations omitted)).
75
539 U.S. at 577-78.
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relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.” Do not
believe it. More illuminating than this bald, unreasoned
disclaimer is the progression of thought displayed by an
earlier passage in the Court's opinion, which notes the
constitutional protections afforded to “personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education,” and then
declares that “persons in a homosexual relationship may
seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual
persons do.” Today's opinion dismantles the structure of
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be
made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar
as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral
disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no legitimate
state interest” for purposes of proscribing that conduct[;]
and if, as the Court coos (casting aside all pretense of
neutrality), “when sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be
but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring”
what justification could there possibly be for denying the
benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising "the
liberty protected by the Constitution”? Surely not the
encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and the
elderly are allowed to marry. This case “does not involve”
the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the
belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the
decisions of this Court. Many will hope that, as the Court
comfortingly assures us, this is so.76
Such recognition of the constitutional legitimacy of same-sex
marriage will obviously not happen anytime soon. However, it will happen
when there is already a patchwork of states that recognize same-sex civil
marriages or their equivalent and when, as is already beginning to happen,
religious bodies exist that recognize the religious, sacramental, or spiritual
nature of a same-sex marriage under their own theological rubric — factors
that will inevitably come to pass over the next decade.
It is not that the state has no role to play in the regulation of
marriage, although one must question how spiritual and civil recognition of
marriage became so intertwined and inseparable in the United States.77 As
the Supreme Court stated in Zablocki v. Redhail, state regulation is limited
to those “reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with

76
77

Id. at 604-605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
See generally Cott, supra n. 58.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol30/iss3/1

2005]

THE FUTURE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

331

decisions to enter into the marital relationship.”78 More intrusive or
limiting restrictions on the right to marry may be adopted by the state only
if they are “supported by sufficiently important state interests and [are]
closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”79
It is important to briefly look at what compelling interests remain
which a state might legitimately seek to assert to support either a state
Defense of Marriage Act or a constitutional amendment banning same-sex
marriage that could pass constitutional muster after Lawrence. What we
see when we look at the Supreme Court’s marriage jurisprudence over time
is that the Court has found that the constitutionally protected interests are
focused, at times, solely on the protected interests of the partners to the
relationship themselves.80
At other times the Court’s focus regarding marriage has been on the
family unit as a whole, with some particular focus upon the interests of
children who may live within that family construct.81 For example, in
Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court stated:
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the
same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation,
childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships . . . [since] it
would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect
to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision
to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our
society.82
What can clearly be seen here, as in all of the Court’s marriage
jurisprudence, is that the Court sees the fundamental right to marry as
having a separate existence alongside the fundamental rights to procreation,
childbirth, child rearing, or family relationships. The right to marry does
not exist solely to realize the rights to procreation, childbirth, child rearing,
or family relationships. In fact, the Court has held that a constitutionally
protected right to sexual activity or to child rearing exists outside the sphere
of marriage.83
The Court has previously articulated its understanding that the
“composition of families varies greatly from household to household[,]”
and that the “demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to
speak of an average American family.”84 In fact, when the Court discusses
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434 U.S. at 386.
Id. at 388.
80
See supra nn. 47-64 and adjoining text.
81
See infra nn. 80-84 and adjoining text; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
82
434 U.S. at 386.
83
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558; Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110 (1989).
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a fundamental interest in childrearing, it must assume all of the various
ways in which persons become parents and create a parent/child
relationship. No one could argue using existing Supreme Court analysis
that a child who is being raised by her biological mother and the mother’s
lesbian partner who has legally adopted her, does not have a
constitutionally protected interest in the parent/child relationship.
Likewise, no one could legitimately argue that the two legal parents of this
child do not have a constitutionally protected interest in child rearing or in
the family relationship.
Rather, a legally recognized parent/child
relationship by its very existence implicates a fundamental interest that is
provided constitutional protection and which can be interfered with only for
some compelling state interest.85
If the constitutional fundamental right to marry has already been
recognized, what further demographic changes must courts incorporate in
their analysis to include persons of the same gender? The reality on the
ground — one which is not likely to change — is that gay and lesbian
persons are raising children in legally recognized family units.86 Gay and
lesbian individuals and couples have adopted some of those children, some
have been biologically conceived through artificial insemination and
surrogacy, and some were the product of a previously existing marriage.
There is little doubt that these gay and lesbian persons and their children
have a right to privacy and liberty with respect to matters of family life
under the Court’s prior decisions.87 Therefore, it makes “little sense to
recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and
not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the
foundation of the family in our society.”88
Even assuming that the state has an interest in the procreation and
rearing of children, what exactly is the scope of that interest and is it
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Id. at 66.
See generally Evan Wolfson, Why Marriage Matters : America, Equality, and Gay People's Right to
Marry (Simon & Schuster 2004). But see Lofton v. Sec. of Dept. of Children and Family Serv., 358 F.3d
804 (11th Cir. 2004), in which a three judge panel of the 11th Circuit upheld Florida’s ban on adoption
by gay and lesbian individuals. The full 11th Circuit Court of Appeals voted 6-6 on whether or not to
rehear the case en banc. The result of this tie vote was that the case was not reheard. The tying vote
was cast by Judge William Pryor who had been added to the court in a recess appointment by President
George W. Bush after he was filibustered by Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee and denied
an open vote. Subsequently, the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal of the case. Lofton v. Sec. of
Dept. of Children and Family Serv., 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). Currently, Florida is the only state that
explicitly bans adoption by unmarried gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals, although New Hampshire
and Utah also prohibit adoptions by any unmarried person. Several states, including California,
Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and the
District of Columbia, allow same-sex couples to jointly petition to adopt. See Human Rights Campaign
Foundation,
http://www.hrc.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Family/Get_Informed1/Laws_Legal_Resources/State_La
ws.htm (last accessed May 17, 2005).
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See supra nn. 79-85 and adjoining text.
88
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
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necessarily furthered by prohibiting gay and lesbian persons from civil
marriage? One should be able to assume that the state’s interest in this area
is to ensure that children are protected and are being raised in environments
in which they can flourish. If that is so, then what is the evidence that
supports the privileging of heterosexual coupling over homosexual coupling
as a locus for rearing children.
Even Justice Scalia has recognized that the procreation argument is
unpersuasive, noting that it could not be used to justify prohibiting samesex marriage given that “the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.”89
However, it is not merely that those who do not and will not have children
are allowed to marry, but, more importantly, that by prohibiting the civil
recognition of same-sex marriages, the state is precluding individuals from
marrying who are currently having and raising children within the state’s
borders. If the role that married couples play in providing a setting in
which the next generation might flourish is one of the reasons that marriage
is a fundamental interest, then this is a reason for same-sex marriage, not
against it.
No doubt there are those who will argue that same-sex marriages
are not constitutionally protected. They argue that the right to marry a
person of the same-sex is not implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or
deeply rooted in the history and tradition of our country.90 Such an
assertion was equally true, however, of interracial marriages, marriages
involving indigents, or prison marriages. Yet, the Court when faced with
these situations ultimately concluded that despite the fact that such
marriages were not implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or deeply
rooted in the history and tradition of our country, these marriages were
protected by the Constitution.91
It would seem, therefore, that asking whether certain marital
relationships were envisioned by the Founders, implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty or deeply rooted in the history and tradition of our country is
not dispositive of the question of constitutional protection.92 Such an
analysis cannot incorporate or account for those marriages and other
interests that the Court has found to be protected under the constitutional
right of privacy without such a textual or historical basis.93 In Lawrence,
the Court suggested, lest we all needed to be reminded, that the
constitutional standard was not static and that as “the Constitution endures,
persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for

89

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-192. See also Mark Strasser, Lawrence, Same-Sex Marriage and the
Constitution: What is Protected and Why?, 38 New. Eng. L. Rev. 667, 676 (2004).
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See discussion of Loving, Zablocki, and Turner, supra n. 47.
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greater freedom”"94
III.

The Miscegenation Analogy: Evolving Theological and
Constitutional Understanding and Analysis

While the analog between the debate over interracial marriage and
same-sex marriage is certainly not perfect, those who oppose same-sex
marriage by employing the identical religious rhetoric as employed by their
forbearers in opposing interracial marriage are, in the light of such history,
suspect.
For example, in 1911, almost 50 years after the end of the Civil
War, following the marriage of Jack Johnson, a black man who happened to
be heavyweight champion of the world, to Lucille Cameron, a white
woman — two Christian ministers recommended that Johnson be lynched
and Governor John Dix of New York declared that “[the] Johnson wedding
. . . is a blot on our civilization. Such desecration of the marriage tie should
never be allowed.”95 Rep. Seaborn Roddenberry of Georgia introduced a
constitutional amendment to define marriage so as to ban all interracial
marriages, stating:
Intermarriage between whites and blacks is repulsive and
averse to every sentiment of pure American spirit. It is
abhorrent and repugnant. It is subversive to social peace.
It is destructive of moral supremacy, and ultimately this
slavery to black beasts will bring the nation to a fatal
conflict.96
Roddenberry asserted that his amendment was necessary to defend
traditional marriage because “no more voracious parasite ever sucked at the
heart of pure society, innocent girlhood, or Caucasian motherhood than the
one which welcomes and recognizes the sacred ties of wedlock between
Africa and America.”97 In 1913, many states saw the introduction of laws
against interracial marriage; these laws already existed in some 25 states.98
This natural order or natural law argument will sound awfully familiar to
those who have listened to the proponents of the Federal Marriage
Amendment and other state constitutional amendments, which articulate the
various reasons why they believe that the civil recognition of same-sex
marriage will somehow harm their heterosexual marriages. But in the case
of some of those conservative religious types in opposition, I am not sure
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which of their many marriages they are seeking to have defended.
So that there will be no misunderstanding, I am not saying that the
experience of a white woman seeking to marry a black man in 1910 is
identical to the experience of a gay couple seeking to marry today. I am
simply pointing out that the appeal to some theocratic understanding of
natural law that defined marriage as between persons of the same race was
as heartily believed in America by many for centuries, as is the natural law
argument regarding same-sex marriage today. Yet, who will raise their
hand today to argue with Rep. Roddenberry or the trial judge in Loving that
the separation of the races and prohibitions against interracial marriage are
a creation of God begun with Adam and Eve and carried forward until
corrupted by humanity? As bigoted as that argument sounds to us today —
100 years from now the same rhetoric regarding same-sex marriage likely
will sound equally bigoted.
It was only in 1967, 100 years after the Civil War, that the Supreme
Court declared laws prohibiting interracial marriage unconstitutional based
not just on the racially discriminatory animus contained in such laws, but
also because the Court had historically recognized that marriage was a
fundamental right protected by the Constitution.99 As the Court wrote in
Loving:
These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without
due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to marry has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Marriage is “one of the basic civil rights of man.”100
In the later case of Zablocki v. Redhail, Justice Marshall made it clear that
Loving rested on concepts of both racial equality and an independent
constitutional right to marry, writing, “[a]lthough Loving arose in the
context of racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this
Court confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental importance to all
individuals.”101
IV.

Conclusion: When Did the Constitution Become a
Mechanism for the Imposition of a Majoritarian Moral and
Theological Worldview?

Civil marriage is a civil contract from which flow certain rights,
benefits, and obligations that should not be denied to America’s gay
citizens, while religious marriage will always be a decision of individual
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religious bodies. Recognition of same-sex civil marriages will never result
in any religious organization being forced by the state to conduct gay
marriages against its religious belief, and basing a call for amending the
Constitution on such a prediction is simply dishonest.
To state the obvious, we live in a constitutional representative
republic, not a democracy. What that means for this discussion is that it
simply does not matter that a majority of people may oppose same-sex
marriage today, any more than it mattered that in polls taken one year
before or one year after Loving declared a constitutional right to interracial
marriage, 70 percent of Americans opposed interracial marriage — a larger
majority than those who today oppose same-sex marriages.102 The purpose
of our constitutional system is not to insure majority rule, as some would
have it, but to insure that the rights of the minority are protected against the
tyranny of that majority.103
Having said that, we are still left with the question of whether the
Constitution requires the recognition of same-sex marriages. This may be
the wrong question, because in reality when one looks at the attitudes of
young people toward their gay and lesbian friends and their attitudes toward
gay marriages, one knows that the inexorable move toward the recognition
of these relationships is inevitable — which is of course why the theocrats
among us are so obsessed with amending the Constitution now.
What is clear is that those seeking to amend the Constitution
through the Federal Marriage Amendment, including the current President
of the United States, believe and fear the following:
1.

The Full Faith and Credit clause of the
Constitution may well require constitutionally
valid marriages that occur in Massachusetts or
elsewhere to be recognized in other states; and,

2.

Federal and state Defense of Marriage Acts, as
well as state constitutional amendments, may well
be stricken as violative of substantive due process
and equal protection, based on the Court’s
reasoning in Lawrence.

What is also clear, based on Lawrence, is that individual states that
wish to prohibit valid same-sex marriages from being recognized will need
more than majoritarian morality and child bearing and rearing as bases for
the public policy exclusion of same-sex marriages. For example, if a state
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argues that heterosexual marriages must be protected for the purpose of
protecting the locus for the rearing of children, then it better first ask itself
whether its agencies and its courts are placing the most needy and
vulnerable children under its care with gay families for foster care and
adoption. If so, then any court in America will see through the breathtaking
intellectual dishonesty at work in an argument claiming that a state’s
compelling interest for prohibiting same-sex marriage is to insure that its
children are reared in a stable heterosexual marital context, while at the
same time, the state is placing children in the households of same-sex
couples. During the oral argument in Lawrence, discriminatory animus was
rife in the Supreme Court chamber. The attorney for the state argued that
Texans’ traditional moral abhorrence for homosexuality and the need to
protect children were adequate bases for criminalizing same-sex sexual
intimacy. The attorney could not answer the simple question of whether the
state of Texas was placing children for foster care and adoption with the
very persons that the state was arguing were morally abhorrent.104 The
answer to that question is that, of course, the state of Texas, like many other
states, is placing a significant percentage of its most needy children in gay
and lesbian households for both foster care and adoption.105
In Lawrence, the Court resurrected its substantive due process
jurisprudence by finding that the right of homosexual intimacy could not be
criminalized solely on the grounds of majoritarian morality or
discriminatory animus.106 Such analysis clearly applies to the right of
marriage, a right that the Court long ago deemed fundamental and
deserving of constitutional protection. As Justice Douglas wrote about
marriage in Griswold:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights – older than our political parties. . . . Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring
and intimate to the degree of being sacred.107
Despite the results of the 2004 election regarding state constitutional
amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage, polls consistently show that a
majority of Americans support the civil recognition of same-sex couples.108
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While a split exists within this majority as to whether such recognition
should be centered upon the concept of civil marriage or some other
nomenclature, such as civil unions, what is clear is that the trajectory on
this issue is moving toward greater civil recognition of same-sex couples.
As the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. said on a number of occasions,
“[t]he arc of history is long, but it bends toward justice.”109
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“Which comes closest to your view? Same sex couples should be allowed to legally marry. OR, Same
sex couples should be allowed to form civil unions but not legally marry. OR, There should be no legal
recognition of a same sex couple's relationship.” Form B (N=552 adults)
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On August 16, 1967 in Atlanta, Georgia, Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered the annual report at the
11th Convention of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The title of his speech that day was
“Where Do We Go From Here?”. He ended the speech with the following:
Let us realize that the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward
justice. Let us realize that William Cullen Bryant is right: “Truth, crushed to
earth, will rise again.” Let us go out realizing that the Bible is right: “Be not
deceived. God is not mocked. (Oh yeah) Whatsoever a man soweth (Yes), that
(Yes) shall he also reap.” This is our hope for the future, and with this faith we
will be able to sing in some not too distant tomorrow, with a cosmic past tense,
“We have overcome! (Yes) We have overcome! Deep in my heart, I did believe
(Yes) we would overcome.”
The parentheticals shown here are the vocal responses from those in attendance. The full
speech may be found at www.stanford.edu/group/King/publications © The Estate of Martin
Luther King, Jr.
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